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Witnessing the ongoing “credibility revolutions” in other disciplines, also political science 
should engage in meta-scientific introspection. Theoretically, this commentary describes why 
scientists in academia’s current incentive system work against their self-interest if they 
prioritize research credibility. Empirically, a comprehensive review of meta-scientific research 
with a focus on quantitative political science demonstrates that threats to the credibility of 
political science findings are systematic and real. Yet, the review also shows the discipline’s 
recent progress toward more credible research. The commentary proposes specific institutional 
changes to better align individual researcher rationality with the collective good of verifiable, 
robust, and valid scientific results.   
Open Science; publication bias; replication crisis; replicability; transparency; meta-science 
Forschung als soziales Dilemma: Eine meta-wissenschaftliche 
Bestandsaufnahme zur Glaubwürdigkeit politikwissenschaftlicher 
Befunde und ein Appell zur Veränderung akademischer 
Anreizstrukturen 
Angesichts der “Glaubwürdigkeitsrevolution” in anderen Sozialwissenschaften liegen Fragen 
nach der Verlässlichkeit institutioneller Wissensproduktion auch in der Politikwissenschaft 
nahe. Dieser Kommentar beschreibt warum Wissenschaftler entgegen ihrem Eigeninteresse 
handeln, wenn sie Forschungsvalidität priorisieren. Ein umfassender Überblick der meta-
wissenschaftlichen Literatur mit Fokus auf die quantitative weist einerseits auf jüngst 
eingeleitete Reformen zur Sicherung reliabler Forschung hin. Andererseits offenbar dieser 
Überblicksartikel systematische Probleme in der Glaubwürdigkeit veröffentlichter 
Forschungsbefunde. Dieser Kommentar schlägt konkrete Maßnahmen vor individuelle 
Forscheranreize in Einklang zu bringen mit dem gemeinschaftlichen Ziel verlässlicher 
Forschung.  
Offene Wissenschaft; Replikationskrise; Transparenz; Replizierbarkeit, Reproduzierbarkeit;   
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Introduction: Open Science – A Contemporary Movement toward Scientific 
Self-Reflection 
One of science’s great virtues is its self-correcting ability. Reflecting upon scientific 
practices is conducive and inherent to the scientific enterprise. Currently, a new stream of meta-
scientific debates is taking roots in many research disciplines, loosely connected by the 
umbrella term “Open Science”. Open Science refers to a meta-scientific, inter-disciplinary 
reform movement, which raises epistemological, methodological, bibliographical, and practical 
concerns about the contemporary mode of knowledge production and advocates openness as a 
process and outcome goal of social inquiry. Open Science discusses the implications of various 
social, economic, and technological changes for the academic system. Since these changes are 
so broad, the Open Science movement encompasses vastly different ideas.1 In many instances, 
Open Science scholars point to legacy gaps in academia, in which the traditions and conventions 
of institutional knowledge production reflect earlier historical conditions. Hence, Open Science 
advocates examine how to harness the potential of new tools and ideas for the scientific 
enterprise. In other words, Open Science’s common denominator is the conviction that the 
current academic system has flaws and inefficiencies that hinder the construction and 
dissemination of knowledge. The movement therefore seeks to improve contemporary means 
of institutional knowledge creation.  
One line of thought within the Open Science movement concerns the output of the 
scientific process, the epistemological status of academic research findings. An influential 
wake-up call was a paper by epidemiologist John Ioannidis, which argued that “most published 
research findings are false” (Ioannidis 2005). While seeming outrageous at the time, a growing 
                                                 
1 Different lines of thought in the Open Science movement comprise “the infrastructure school (which is concerned 
with the technological architecture), the public school (which is concerned with the accessibility of knowledge 
creation), the measurement school (which is concerned with alternative impact measurement), the democratic 
school (which is concerned with access to knowledge) and the pragmatic school (which is concerned with 
collaborative research)” Fecher/Friesike (2014: 17). 
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body of meta-scientific research in the behavioral and social sciences has substantiated this 
claim ever since (for historical overviews, see Elman et al. 2018; Freese/Peterson 2017). 
Psychology in particular has experienced a lasting shake-up of disciplinary self-confidence. 
After a systematic assessment of the evidential value of the discipline’s findings, psychological 
science has undergone a rocky but deeply transformative phase, which has turned the 
discipline’s production and evaluation of scientific findings upside down (Nelson et al. 2018). 
Within a few years, psychology underwent fundamental changes in hiring practices 
(Schönbrodt/Mellor 2018), publishing formats (Hardwicke/Ioannidis 2018; Nosek et al. 2018), 
and statistical practices (Simmons et al. 2011; Motyl et al. 2017), and has rewritten standards 
for scientific publication (Nosek et al. 2015). Hence, after “psychology’s renaissance” (Nelson 
et al. 2018) and recent “credibility revolutions” (Angrist/Pischke 2010) in other disciplines, one 
question naturally arises: Is political science more immune to the factors that undermined the 
credibility of other scientific disciplines or is the partial inertia in our field due to the fact that 
we have not yet received the news? This review shows that both perspectives have merits: 
Political science actually performs better than others disciplines in various criteria of research 
credibility, which is in part due to institutional reforms that were already undertaken. At the 
same time, however, meta-scientific evidence shows that severe systematic disincentives 
undermine the credibility of the discipline’s evidence base to an extent that warrants closer 
attention of the members of this academic community. 
In light of the ongoing change toward greater openness and trustworthiness around and 
within political science, this commentary examines the state of political science with respect to 
credibility of its quantitative empirical findings.  Specifically, this article has three goals: First, 
it analyzes the relationship between academia’s contemporary reward structures and the 
credibility of research findings. Employing social dilemmas as a guiding concept 
(Scheliga/Friesike 2014), this article identifies an incentive gap between the common values 
science seeks to achieve and the incentive system that penalizes the individual scientist who 
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prioritizes research credibility. Second, assessing whether and to what extent these 
disincentives undermine the trustworthiness of political science research, this article is the first 
to conduct a comprehensive review of the meta-scientific literature on the evidential value of 
contemporary findings in quantitative political science. Third, learning from the transformation 
in other disciplines, this article discusses options for improving the credibility of political 
science findings. Altogether, by reviewing the past few years of disciplinary self-reflection and 
by proposing measures the discipline might take in the next few years, this commentary hopes 
to serve as a primer for contemporary debates on research credibility in quantitative political 
science.2 
Assessing the Credibility of Quantitative Political Science Findings 
As authors, reviewers or readers, political scientists frequently judge the credibility of 
single studies. That is, scholars assess the “extent to which the research methods and data 
underlying findings can be considered reliable and valid representations of reality” (Cook et al. 
2018: 2). Yet, even though single studies are regularly subject to credibility evaluations, 
political science has only recently begun to assess the credibility of a larger body of studies. 
Since these efforts are in their infancy, the discipline lacks criteria for systematic credibility 
evaluations. Thinking about the feasibility and the potential content of such criteria raises 
fundamental epistemological questions about what makes scientific studies more or less 
credible. 
Here, political science can learn from psychology, in particular from LeBel et al. (2018) 
who recently proposed a meta-scientific framework for the quantification of research 
credibility. Despite the fact that their framework does not fully acknowledge the specific 
                                                 
2 Even if similar discussions are gaining traction in other research cultures Kern/Gleditsch (2017) (Kern/Gleditsch 
2017; Monroe 2018; Elman et al. 2018; Janz 2018), this commentary focuses on quantitative political science as 
published in English-language peer-reviewed journals, which has attracted most meta-scientific attention in recent 
years. Although it is a debate worth having, it is beyond the scope of this commentary to discuss how the evidence 
and arguments presented here can be applied to other research cultures and publication formats in political science.  
Wuttke (2019): Credibility of Political Science Findings 
5 
 
epistemological challenges of the social sciences, it serves as a useful starting point to get a 
sense of the credibility of political science findings, judged by criteria that are valued across 
disciplinary boundaries. Specifically, the framework departs from the premise that credible 
findings are those that repeatedly survived high-quality and risky attempts to prove them wrong. 
Thus, based on the basic principle of falsification and falsifiability, the framework suggests four 
dimensions for assessing research credibility.  
The first criterion for research credibility refers to pre-producibility (Stark 2018) 
whereas the other three criteria demand different forms of re-producibility (or replicability). 
Specifically, the first criterion assesses whether studies make themselves accessible to 
falsification attempts by providing method and data transparency. The second criterion entails 
the most basic form of empirical falsification, analytical reproducibility, i.e. the verification of 
results by repeating the same data processing and statistical analyses on the original data.3 The 
third criterion, analytical robustness, also presupposes the use of old data but assesses results’ 
sensitivity to different data-processing and data-analytic decisions. Effect replicability, finally, 
refers to what Freese/Peterson (2017) call repeatability and generalizability: whether an effect 
is observed when the analysis is repeated with new data.4  
This framework will guide the following investigation on the credibility of the current 
body of published political science findings. These criteria do not suffice for definite 
judgements on a study’s validity, because each assessment of the truth value of a study would 
require in-depth examinations of a study’s research design. However, considering that valid 
knowledge is evidence-based and rule-bound (Elman et al. 2018), failing these criteria casts 
doubts on whether the reported findings were properly derived from the evidence and in 
accordance with the academic community’s rules of institutional knowledge productions. In 
                                                 
3 Freese/Peterson (2017) call this type of replication verifiability. 
4 These criteria can be ordered hierarchically in the sense that the latter are more likely fulfilled when the former 
are met. 
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other words, all else equal, we have more reasons to trust studies that withstood repeated 
falsification attempts, and we should be worried if political science studies systematically failed 
these criteria of credible research findings.  
The remainder of the article explains how each criterion constitutes a collective good of 
the scientific enterprise and how the incentive structure in the academic system is either 
conducive or detrimental to the individual rationality of researchers to work toward its 
attainment. These analytical discussions are intertwined with a review of meta-scientific 
evidence about the credibility of political science’s current evidence base. 
Method and Data Transparency 
Regardless of the individual research methods, “all evidence-based approaches to social 
inquiry in political science have a set of common characteristics that allow them to benefit from 
transparency” (Elman et al. 2018: 31). This is because members of research communities share 
common beliefs and norms about the adequate production of valid knowledge claims. 
Therefore, in line with the tenet that science is about “show me”, not “trust me” (cf. Stark 2018), 
data and production transparency enable the mutual reassurance or validation that these rules 
were complied with. According to guidelines of the American Political Science Association, 
thus, “researchers have an ethical obligation to facilitate the evaluation of their evidence based 
knowledge claims through data access, production transparency, and analytic transparency” 
(Lupia/Elman 2014: 21). Moreover, data transparency in particular enables the accumulation of 
knowledge by building upon prior work (secondary data analysis). Consequently, it is easy to 
see how open data and open materials represent a collective good that may benefit all members 
of the scientific community and the scientific enterprise itself. 
However, despite data and production transparency being valuable goals, it is a costly 
good to produce from the perspective of the individual researcher because it requires the 
investment of resources. These costs comprise the researcher’s time but also potential losses 
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researchers might fear as by-products of transparency (being scooped, having one’s errors 
exposed, etc.; see Washburn et al. 2018; Tenopir et al. 2011).  
Because collective and individual rationality do not align, it is no surprise that many 
political science studies fall short of meeting the method and data transparency criterion. First, 
studies rarely provide the information necessary to repeat or fully assess a study. Humphreys 
(2018) highlighted the difficulty he and coauthors had in declaring designs for articles published 
in major political science journals. Very commonly, studies did not provide sufficient 
information to conduct a comprehensive diagnosis of the study’s designs. In addition to 
insufficient method transparency, many studies to not provide data transparency either. When 
the publishing journal does not require the provision of data and code, a majority of studies in 
the discipline’s top outlets do not provide such materials to the community (Key 2016; 
Stockemer et al. 2018). What is more, even when researchers make efforts to provide materials, 
they are often practically unavailable because three or four out of 10 links to the data are 
broken—even in very recently published studies (Key 2016; Gertler/Bullock 2017). However, 
when study authors are approached directly to share the underlying materials, about one out of 
two researchers do make the data available (Stockemer et al. 2018).5 In line with the idea of 
data transparency as a social dilemma, these numbers show that political scientists are more 
inclined to share data and code when asked but that they do not invest many resources in 
transparency when not asked. Considering the fierce competition researchers face in their 
academic career, under the current incentive structure researchers may be well advised to spend 
their time on publishing yet another study than on publishing the material for their previous 
article.  
                                                 
5 Note that making one’s work accessible to inter-subjective assessment goes beyond data transparency 
and includes disclosure of data-analytical and processing procedures. Stockemer et al. (2018) discuss cases in 
which attempts to replicate prior results failed because neither the syntax nor the published article provided 
sufficient information to repeat the authors’ analytical steps.  
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Luckily, having studied for decades how to solve collective action problems, political 
science should be in a good situation to overcome the ongoing transparency problems in its 
discipline. Indeed, few social science disciplines have been more dynamic in creating 
incentives, rules, and infrastructures for the promotion of research transparency than political 
science in recent years (Elman et al. 2018). Political scientists have helped establish data 
repositories, thereby lowering the cost for researchers to easily store their material. Others have 
participated in the PRO initiative6, in which reviewers call for data transparency during the 
review process, thereby incentivizing researchers to comply with transparency standards and 
putting pressure on editors and journals to adapt data-sharing policies. Most influential, 
however, were the discussions on DA-RT (Lupia/Elman 2014; Monroe 2018; Janz 2018). As a 
consequence of these intra-disciplinary debates on research transparency, awareness of these 
issues has greatly increased: Within only a few years, transparency-related policies have greatly 
expanded. Among the first journals to require data-sharing, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 
adopted transparency policies years ago (Ghergina/Katsanidou 2013: 341). Other journals have 
followed suit and, by now, the majority of prominent journals in the discipline has instated 
transparency requirements (Stockemer et al. 2018: 2; Ghergina/Katsanidou 2013), with many 
journals demanding scholars to publish full reproduction materials (Key 2016).  
Accordingly, political science has recently made significant steps to align collective 
goods with individual researcher rationality by making access to a private good (publication in 
leading journals) dependent on its contribution to the common good of method and data 
transparency. Yet, even though prominent journals acted as vanguards in promoting 
transparency within the discipline, we must acknowledge that most less-known political science 
journals have not yet established binding transparency policies and that, among those who did, 
the quality of transparency varies tremendously (Key 2016). Still, albeit not yet standard 
                                                 
6 See https://opennessinitiative.org/ 
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practice, data and method transparency are about to become commonplace. Therefore, the broad 
attention to the new transparency rules in leading journals may facilitate adjustments of 
descriptive and injunctive norms within the community, thereby creating second-order effects 
that help overcome the social dilemma of transparent political science research. 
Analytical Reproducibility 
Analytical reproducibility is a necessary requirement for the credibility of empirical 
studies because reported findings that do not follow properly from the study’s data cannot be 
regarded as valid knowledge claims (cf. Freese/Peterson 2017: 152). In other words, a study’s 
credibility diminishes when the reported evidence is distorted by blunt mistakes or 
misspecifications in statistical procedures. 
Although no researcher wants to publish flawed results, ensuring analytical 
reproducibility requires significant amounts of work and therefore presents a costly investment 
from a researcher’s perspective. At the same time, considering contemporary academic culture 
and publishing practices, there is a good chance that a lack of analytical reproducibility will not 
be (widely) noticed.  Despite the famous call for “Replication, Replication" (King 1995) more 
than 20 years ago, replications continue to be rare (Freese/Peterson 2017). Despite calls for a 
visible outlet for replication studies (Ishiyama 2014), such a replication journal does not exist 
yet. 
It is telling that initially not a single article accepted for publication could be flawlessly 
verified when the American Journal of Political Science started to assess the analytical 
reproducibility of newly accepted articles in 2015. 7  In political science journals without 
verification policies, Stockemer et al. (2018) showed that one out of three studies could not be 
analytically reproduced even when the authors made data accessible. In some of the tests for 
                                                 
7  See https://politicalsciencereplication.wordpress.com/2015/05/04/leading-journal-verifies-articles-before-
publication-so-far-all-replications-failed/  
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analytical reproducibility, the reproduced results deviated from the reported results. In other 
cases, reproducibility was impossible due to poor organization of data or code. Hence, for a 
significant portion of political science studies, we cannot be sure to obtain the same results if 
we re-ran the same analyses on the same data. 
Presumably, all political scientists can agree on the goal of avoiding the publication of 
findings that evidently do not follow from the data. Hence, it is encouraging to observe that the 
repeated call for greater emphasis on reproducibility is now materializing in the discipline’s 
actual practices. Recently, journals have established replication article formats (JEPS, JJPS), 
and even top journals begin to publish analytical reproductions of previous articles (APSR, see 
Cingranelli/Filippov 2018). 
 Actually, a large step toward the collective good of analytical reproducibility could be 
made by rather simple means. The American Journal of Political Science has shown that 
publication outlets can achieve a verifiability rate of 100% (Lenz/Sahn 2017: 3) as opposed to 
the afore-mentioned verifiability rate of one third of other journals (Stockemer et al. 2018).   
What is needed is to ensure adherence to transparency policies with dedicated verification 
procedures. Verifying analytical reproducibility requires staff and is therefore costly.8  For 
several journals, this is not a suitable option. This is different, however, in the case of many 
prominent journals that are the official publication outlets of academic associations, for which 
licensing trademarks to publishers often carries significant revenues to the associations. In these 
cases, analytical reproducibility also becomes a question of prioritizing: How important is it for 
us as members of an academic community to ensure the evidential value of the findings reported 
in our journals and how much are we willing to invest in securing the credibility of these results? 
                                                 
8 For details on the costs of AJPS’s verification processes, see https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/rethinking-
research/should-journals-be-responsible-reproducibility  




Analytical robustness derives its importance from the fact that hundreds or thousands of 
analytical decisions are necessary before a finding can be reported in an academic study. Even 
though all of these decisions may affect the final estimate, the reader usually sees only a small 
subset of all potential outcomes. Hence, a credible study is a study in which the reported 
findings are a good representation of all reasonable analytical choices the researcher could 
make.  
Explaining how structural factors in the academic system undermine analytical 
robustness requires a broader perspective that includes the reward system of contemporary 
academic publishing. Psychology’s replication crisis illustrates how flawed incentive structures 
may fundamentally undermine a discipline’s scientific credibility. After a thorough re-
examination, psychological science recently needed to revise seminal textbook findings such 
as ego-depletion, which is now seen as lacking credible empirical support, while decades of 
previous research had seemingly provided repeated and concordant evidence of their presence 
(Vadillo et al. 2018; Nelson et al. 2018). The true population estimate and the average estimate 
reported in scientific literatures may diverge significantly when the published pile of evidence 
represents a biased collection of false–positive findings from an even larger body of 
unpublished studies whose true population estimate denotes the absence of the hypothesized 
effect. Psychology’s replication crisis illustrates how flawed reward systems may lead to a body 
of literature that comprises dozens or even hundreds of studies that support the existence of an 
effect although the effect is truly absent or not meaningful in size.  
One structural cause behind these biases is rooted in the specific public preferences of 
academic journals. When deciding whether to publish a manuscript, scientific outlets not only 
consider the merits of theory and research design but also have an eye on the study’s findings, 
preferring studies with novel, positive, and clean results (Nosek et al. 2018). Systematic 
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preferences to publish studies with positive and clean findings also exist in political science, 
particularly among the discipline’s leading journals (Gerber et al. 2001; Gerber et al. 2010). 
Here the hypothesis of no publication bias was rejected at a probability of 1 to 32 billion (Gerber 
2008). What is more, the likelihood of publication increases when effect sizes are larger 
(Esarey/Wu 2016).9 To quantify the extent of this bias, Franco et al. (2014) traced the fortunes 
of a clearly specified and known set of conducted research projects in political science and  
examined whether a conducted research project was more likely to be published when the 
study’s outcome coincided with the preferences of academic journals. The authors showed that 
projects with positive findings were forty percentage points (or three times) more likely to be 
published and sixty percentage points more likely to be written up. In other words, when 
researchers test a hypothesis and the results do not provide confirming evidence, there is a good 
chance that the academic community will never know about these results.  
Hence, there is ample evidence that study results affect whether the study is published, 
which is a fundamental problem in gauging the true population estimate from prior literature. 
Imagine one social phenomenon was examined in multiple studies but only the positive studies 
were published. In this case, only the positive studies would be accessible to the interested 
reader, only the positive studies would be accessible to the interested reader, but studies with 
negative or more ambiguous findings —which differ systematically from the accessible 
studies—would remain in the file-drawer. Publication bias, thus, narrows the reader’s field of 
vision to a small fragment of the empirical reality, and—what is worse—the fragment we see 
differs from the portion we cannot see.  
Examining the literature on democratic innovations, for example, reveals that less than 
five percent of published research reports on failed interventions and no top journal ever 
published studies about failures or unintended consequences in democratic innovations 
                                                 
9 Esarey/Wu (2016) estimate that the true value of published relationship is on average 40% smaller than their 
published value. 
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(Spada/Ryan 2017). However, anecdotal evidence and basic human experience suggest that, in 
fact, not all past experiments on democratic innovations were successful. Hence, making 
judgements about the success of democratic innovations from the published literature alone 
presumably leads to wrong estimates about the effectiveness of such tools. Naturally, 
publication bias is not specific to the literature of democratic innovation, but the subfield is only 
one example of distortions in the political science literature more generally.  
Unfortunately, the incongruence between published and unpublished findings is not the 
only and not the most problematic consequence of the journals’ preferences for novel, clean, 
and significant results. The graver consequence is that publication biases constitute a social 
dilemma. Considering the importance of publications as a currency for scientific success, 
publication decisions based on study outcomes incentivize scientists to get a hold of the one 
element of the research process they actually should not control: the findings of a study.  
Publication bias incentivizes researchers to deviate from the orderly process of 
conducting research that philosophers of science have proposed for ensuring credible research 
(cf. Chambers 2017). According to one stream of thought in the philosophy of science, research 
should follow the hypothetico-deductive model of knowledge creation, according to which 
research begins with the theoretical deduction of a hypothesis (Chambers 2017; 
Pearl/Mackenzie 2018). Next, the researcher designs a decisive empirical test for the 
hypothesis, the results of which are used to inform further theorizing by rejecting or revising 
the theory. In other words, the researcher makes a theoretical prediction about the world and 
then tests if the hypothesized phenomenon is observed in practice. Even though this description 
is overly simplistic and alternative ways for knowledge production exist, this idealized model 
describes the process that most studies in quantitative political science try to mimic, which is 
visible in the formal structure of most published articles. However, a scientific culture that 
privileges clean and positive findings provides incentives not to adhere to this model of 
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knowledge production, despite promising credible evidence, but instead to adhere to a model 
of publication production that promises academic careers.  
According to the idealized model, researchers have clearly specified the empirical test 
before it is conducted. In practice, however, extensive analytical discretion allows researchers 
to run multiple tests. Hence, models and corresponding results may be selected according to the 
presumed likelihood of achieving publication success with the respective findings. For instance, 
modifying the analytical strategies until significant results appear (p-hacking) is a sound 
research strategy if it is transparently disclosed; otherwise, such research practices severely 
threaten the validity of any empirical study (see https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/phacking/ 
for an interactive demonstration; for a simulation of the consequences of p-hacking see 
Humphreys et al. 2013). Simmons et al. (2011) showed that the false–positive error rate 
increases from the usual five percent to an astonishing 60 percent when analytical discretion is 
exploited on only three dimensions of researcher flexibility. Moreover, employing real data, the 
authors managed to provide seeming evidence for the evidently false hypothesis that participant 
age diminished after listening to “When I’m Sixty-Four” by the Beatles. Put differently, they 
showed that exploiting researcher degrees of freedom allows for the generation of seeming 
evidence even for the most implausible hypotheses.  
Apart from fitting the data to the hypothesis, researchers may also fit the hypothesis to 
the data when striving for clean results. Hypothesizing after the results are known, HARKing 
(HARKing, Kerr 1998) reverses the order of scientific steps as originally proposed by the 
hypothetico-deductive model. HARKing is compatible with an exploratory research process. 
Yet, most quantitative political science studies purport adherence to a hypothesis-driven 
confirmatory research process, in which HARKing resembles the proverbial peasant who first 
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shoots the hole in the fence and then paints the bullseye around it (cf. Shweder/Fiske 1986: 6).10 
Hence, HARKing is yet another form of analytical flexibility that undermines the credibility of 
the research process, but it may serve as a gateway to produce clean and positive results. 
A growing body of meta-scientific studies provides indicative evidence for the 
questionable use of such research practices in the political science literature.  Examining the 
race discrimination literature, Zigerell (2017) demonstrated several cases of selective reporting 
in which alternative model specifications remained unreported  when they led to different 
results. In a large-scale examination of 249 political science studies from a research competition 
for which data and research questions were known, Franco et al. (2015) showed that only one 
out of five published studies reported all experimental conditions and outcome variables. The 
average study left 0.5 experimental conditions and 3.1 experimental outcomes undisclosed. 
Hence, for a typical political science study, there is a good chance that the reader is unaware of 
the existence of evidence, which is relevant to the assessment of the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
Studies that investigate researcher degrees of freedoms in model specification 
(Simonsohn et al. 2015; Rohrer et al. 2017; Montgomery/Nyhan 2010; Steegen et al. 2016; 
Abel Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, Anthony Heyes 2018) provide additional insights into the practice 
of analytical flexibility. For instance, Lenz/Sahn (2017) showed that political science studies 
using observational data frequently report bivariate relationships when they are statistically 
significant. Yet, when the associations of interest become significant only after the inclusion of 
additional covariates, bivariate statistics are rarely reported and usually only the significant 
multivariate model is disclosed.  
                                                 
10 Note that HARKing and confirmatory analysis are perfectly reconcilable if the new data is collected 
before both analytical steps but not without the collection of new data: “Just as conspiracy theories are never 
falsified by the facts that they were designed to explain, a hypothesis that is developed on the basis of exploration 
of a data set is unlikely to be refuted by that same data. Thus, one always needs a fresh data set for testing one’s 
hypothesis.” Wagenmakers et al. (2012). 
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Because meta-scientific research on the credibility of political science findings is still 
rare, these studies do not provide conclusive evidence about intentions and causes of 
researchers’ use of their analytical discretion. However, two pieces of evidence suggest a 
significant role of strategic publication considerations in the use of researcher degrees of 
freedom. First, the above-cited findings by Franco et al. (2014), according to which researchers 
consider the likelihood of publication success in the decision whether to write up results, 
suggest the existence of similar publication-oriented considerations in the decision how to write 
up certain findings. Second, meta-scientific evidence from other disciplines quantifies the 
extent to which analytical flexibility is exploited to maximize publication success. Researcher 
surveys reveal that a majority of scientists in other behavioral disciplines openly report past 
uses of questionable research practices (Fiedler/Schwarz 2016; Fox et al. 2018). Persuasive 
evidence on the misuse of analytical discretion also derives from clinical trials, which were 
recently required by law to pre-specify their analytical strategy before data collection. As a 
consequence of transparent pre-registration, analytical freedom diminished, and the rate of 
allegedly successful clinical trials decreased dramatically. The sudden drop in successful trial 
may have two reasons: Either drug researchers suddenly became much less successful in 
inventing new medicine after pre-registration was mandated or they suddenly became much 
less successful in making ineffective drugs appear to be effective (Kaplan/Irvin 2015).  
Public pre-registration also allows tracing the outcome of clinical studies, showing for 
depression drugs that all trials with positive findings were published but almost no negative 
study made it into publications that would acknowledge the absence of the hypothesized effect. 
Instead, the majority of originally negative trials was either published with a new spin in 
narrative or ‘became positive’ by switching or omitting outcome variables (Vries et al. 2018). 
Hence, although we cannot assess if and to what extent researcher degrees of freedom are 
misused in political science, other disciplines show that the reported findings reflect the true 
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population estimate. However, they also reflect strategic researcher considerations to make a 
study visible and interesting.  
The preceding discussion illustrated the scope of researcher degrees of freedom, 
showing how structural incentives invite misuses of analytical discretion. When reported 
findings do not resemble reasonable analytical choices of the researcher but instead are 
determined by other considerations than approximating the true population estimate then 
analytical robustness decreases. Hence, misuses of analytical flexibility undermines the 
credibility of scientific findings. Every attempt to confine the credibility-undermining potential 
of researcher degrees of freedom faces the challenge that analytical flexibility is inherent to the 
research process and ambiguous in nature. Its misuse cannot be prevented with abstract rules, 
because the distinction between reasonable and questionable uses of analytical flexibility often 
requires case-by-case, in-depths examinations. The adequate response to this challenge is 
making the research process more transparent for those who judge its outcomes. For instance, 
judging whether it is reasonable to gloss over an experiment’s second experimental condition 
requires awareness of its existence. Yet, political science lacks behind in maintaining 
institutional incentives to enhance the transparency of the research process.  
Political science can make a tremendous step toward analytical robustness if it follows 
other disciplines and starts to pre-register prospective studies (Nosek et al. 2018). Publishing 
research intentions and analytical procedures before collecting data has become a rapidly 
expanding practice in other behavioral sciences, in which the number of pre-registered studies 
doubles each year and now exceeds 20,000 pre-analysis plans published on one hosting 
repository alone (Hardwicke/Ioannidis 2018).11 Pre-registration allows for adapting analytical 
decisions after observing the data, but deviations from the pre-analysis plans are reported 
transparently,  thereby establishing a clear distinction between predictive confirmatory analyses 
                                                 
11  https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/08/scientists-can-collectively-sense-which-psychology-
studies-are-weak/568630/, last accessed August 28, 2018. 
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and postdictive exploratory analyses (Nosek et al. 2018). Political scientists may learn from 
experiences in other disciplines and built on existing advice in order to apply pre-registrations 
even on observational (Burlig 2018), secondary (Weston et al. 2018a), and qualitative (Mellor 
et al. 2018) data.  
Because pre-registration requires researchers to think clearly about research goals and 
strategies before the data is collected, pre-registration may foster meaningful theory-driven 
research. However, it purposefully also reduces researcher degrees of freedoms to polish their 
results. Hence, a wide-spread use of pre-registration may enhance scientific credibility. 
Nevertheless, but as long as publication bias exists, researchers’ self-interest to retain control 
over the results remains, and this is at odds with the purpose of pre-registration. The most 
promising institutional reform to overcome this social dilemma is the adoption of pre-
registration in combination with result-blind reviews (called registered reports, see 
www.cos.io/rr/). A steadily growing number of journals (currently 132) in the behavioral 
sciences has introduced new submission formats in which articles are reviewed and potentially 
accepted prior to data collection. Although slowly, the idea of pre-registration in combination 
with result-blind reviewing is gaining traction in political science. Some journals conducted 
trials with these article formats (CPS, Findley et al. 2016), and first journals started offering 
registered reports as a regular option for submissions (JJPS, Nature Human Behavior).  
Pre-registration and result-blind review are not the panacea for all problems regarding 
analytical robustness. For instance, political scientists often analyze pre-existing large-scale 
datasets for which pre-registration is sometimes possible (Weston/Bakker 2018; Weston et al. 
2018b; Burlig 2018; Nosek et al. 2018) but not always suitable. Since such datasets offer an 
incredible number of reasonable model specifications, in these cases it is particularly important 
to know that significant effects provide more informational value than “merely [demonstrating] 
that it is possible to find a specification that fits the author's favorite hypothesis” (Ho et al. 2007: 
199). Methods that are less model-dependent (Ho et al. 2007; Wilcox 2017) or that transparently 
Wuttke (2019): Credibility of Political Science Findings 
19 
 
report model-sensitivity (Montgomery/Nyhan 2010; Simonsohn et al. 2015; Steegen et al. 
2016) present methodological solutions to provide readers with the necessary information to 
assess the analytical robustness of research findings in such cases. 
Effect Replicability 
Effect replicability is an important yardstick for assessing the credibility of findings. 
This is because findings are less likely to replicate with newly collected data if the original 
findings resulted from extensive p-hacking, HARKing, or from mistakes in data processing. 
Hence, all previously discussed structural problems feed into low rates of effect replicability.  
Because political science investigates fluid social systems that are undergoing constant 
change, most political science findings are context-dependent and, thus, do not necessarily 
generalize across time and space (Shweder/Fiske 1986). Therefore, not each previous finding 
is expected to replicate if the study was conducted again under today’s circumstances. Yet, 
replications of previous studies still are valuable tools to assess scientific credibility because 
theoretically sound studies clearly specify the boundary conditions for which authors expect an 
effect.  
Unfortunately, political science currently does not invest much effort on theoretical 
discussions of boundary conditions or on empirical replicability tests. As discussed with regard 
to analytical reproducibility above, replications are a rare species in the political science 
ecosystem (Freese/Peterson 2017). The low appreciation for replication is lamentable because, 
without replications, it is impossible to know whether findings are either unconfirmed genuine 
discoveries or unchallenged fallacies (cf. Chambers 2017: 50). If conducted in a theoretically 
informed way, replications function as the scientific immune system that takes the principle of 
falsification seriously and eliminates untrue findings from the literature (cf. Chambers 2017: 
46).  
Wuttke (2019): Credibility of Political Science Findings 
20 
 
In recent years, replications have become more widespread, helping to answer the 
fundamental question to which extent previous findings have informational value in predicting 
the occurrence of phenomena in the contemporary context. The Social Science Replication 
Project (SSRP) recently conducted highly powered replication attempts of 21 influential social 
science experiments (Camerer et al. 2018). Although all of the original studies were conducted 
very recently and the replication design was developed with and approved by the original 
authors, only 13 replication studies found significant effects in the same direction as the original 
study. This replication rate is larger than the estimate obtained in similar replication efforts in 
psychology (Open Science Collaboration 2015) and similar to that in economics (Camerer et 
al. 2016).    
While some failures to replicate may result from changes in the social or political 
context (Sparrow 2018), the SSRP also provides indicative evidence about the credibility of the 
original results. Among the non-replicated studies, there was essentially no evidence for the 
original findings, leading some original authors in conjecture of additional evidence to declare 
their loss of confidence in the relevance of the effects they originally described 
(Gervais/Norenzayan 2018). Moreover, the replicated effect sizes are on average only half as 
large as the original effect sizes. Importantly, chance alone cannot explain these differences, 
because the effect size discrepancies follow a clear pattern—that is they are consistently lower 
in the replications than in the original studies even among studies which successfully replicated. 
Finally, the SSRP corroborated previous evidence that a study’s replication likelihood is 
associated with study-level characteristics (e.g., the original study’s p-value), which partly 
explains why independent researchers in many cases correctly predicted which studies would 
replicate.  
The insight that the likelihood of replicating a recent and prominent social science 
experiment is not much larger than the flip of a coin may shake prior beliefs about the predictive 
power of existing social scientific studies on future occurrences of social phenomena. Since the 
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social sciences are not used to large-scale replications, there is still a lot to learn about the proper 
assessment of such replication results. In this vein, the SSRP may trigger debates about how 
much the limited replicability is attributable to contextual changes or whether biases in the 
estimates of the original studies are reasonable causes. In order to better understand the former 
and to reduce the latter, the SSRP will hopefully be a stepping stone toward more frequent and 
systematic replication efforts of previous observational and experimental studies in the political 
sciences. 
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Table 1: The credibility of political science findings as a social dilemma 
 Collective good Disincentives Status in political science Fix 





loss of competitive 
advantage 
Many or most studies do not provide 
data and materials,  








from the data 
Researcher resources, 
low awareness 
1 in 3 studies not verifiable; 









resemble entire body 
of knowledge 
Publication bias, 
incentivizes misuse of 
analytical flexibility 
Strong publication bias: Positive 
findings three times more likely to be 
published; 
substantial underreporting: On average 
0.5 experimental conditions 
undisclosed; 
potential misuse of analytical 
flexibility in observational studies 
Study pre-registration 
before data collection to 
emphasize theory and 
design and to confine 
analytical flexibility; 
result-blind peer review to 
reduce publication bias 
Effect 
replicability 
Falsification All of the above 1 in 3 experimental social science 
studies do not replicable 
All of the above 
Note: Status estimates refer to small and unrepresentative sets of studies. See text for more information.




Political science helps understand the intricacies of social life and informs politicians as 
well as citizens in their efforts to change it to the better.  However, political science faces 
increasing scrutiny by the public and other stakeholders who question the discipline’s capacity 
to meet these goals (Elman et al. 2018). Responding to such skepticism along the principles of 
the scientific enterprise means to respond with a sober evaluation of the practices and outcomes 
of academic knowledge creation, that is, to employ the method of social inquiry on ourselves.  
Based on a framework to assess the credibility of scientific findings, this article 
reviewed the meta-scientific evidence with a focus on the quantitative political science 
literature. The main result of these meta-scientific inquiries is that a significant portion of 
examined studies do not meet one or several credibility criteria. Specifically, by not providing 
data and method transparency, many or most political science studies make themselves 
inaccessible to inter-subjective validity assessments, and—when put to a test—the empirical 
findings of many studies cannot be verified. Moreover, findings in published and unpublished 
research diverge strongly and systematically, and the published studies show evidence of 
substantial underreporting. Altogether, meta-scientific evidence indicates deficiencies in the 
credibility of political science studies and suggests that the body of published political science 
findings is not an unbiased representation of the entire evidence base (see Table 1 above for an 
overview). 
Even though it remains an open question to which extent the published estimates deviate 
from true population estimates, this article illustrates how the academic reward system 
incentivizes novel and clean results at the expense of the findings’ validity. Because “scientists 
are meant to be detectives searching for the truth rather than lawyers cherry-picking the 
evidence to fit an argument" (Chambers/Etchells 2018), we should overcome scientific cultures 
that require researchers to polish and re-interpret their findings until they fit the preferences of 
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academic publishing. Concrete institutional reforms (e.g., dedicated syntax verification 
procedures and pre-registered studies in combination with result-blind reviewing) could be 
implemented to overcome social dilemmas in which researchers hurt their own interests when 
prioritizing research credibility.  
Although institutional changes are central to overcoming social dilemmas, the academic 
community is small enough for each individual to make a difference toward a more transparent, 
reproducible valid political science: The reviewer who does not consider the eye-catching 
results but instead asks for public reproduction material to evaluate the accuracy of the findings; 
the editor who provides journal space for replications of previous studies in the outlet; the 
conference discussant who praises the transparent disclosure of negative findings; the dean who 
gives a premium to job applicants who made their research transparent; the student who shares 
what she has learned about open science practices and the scientist who is willing to avoid 
questionable research practices many of us have employed in the past. Altogether, when top-
down leadership occurs in concert with bottom-up enthusiasm (Gernsbacher 2018: 3), it is 
feasible to establish those norms and rules that are yet missing for a more open and reliable 
scientific culture.  
Even if the intention of this commentary was to highlight the necessity and potential of 
intra-disciplinary reform, several notes of balance are warranted. First, when we report above 
that many studies do not meet certain credibility criteria, then it should also be noted that the 
remaining studies do meet the standards of scientific credibility. Second, the reviewed meta-
scientific evidence relies on small and biased samples of studies. Hence, it is desirable that more 
meta-scientific research will be conducted to assess the credibility of the discipline’s current 
evidence base. Third, in addition to incentive-induced threats to scientific credibility discussed 
in this commentary, other systemic shortcomings may undermine the validity of research 
findings, such as prevailing methodological misconceptions (Rinke/Schneider 2015). Fourth, 
as all political scientists operate within the prevailing norms and incentive structures of their 
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academic communities, pointing to lacks in credibility is not to criticize individual scientists 
but is a call for changing these norms: to align academic rewards with scientific values.  
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